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ABSTRACT
Event study methodology was used to assess the effects of both layoff and employment guarantee
announcements on shareholder returns. The Wall Street Journal was used to identify 368 firms
that announced layoffs and 13 firms that announced employment guarantees in 1993 or 1994. 
The results were used to test the validity of four hypotheses: labor-cost, efficiency, industrial-
relations-effect, and signaling-effect.  The results show that both layoff announcements and
employment guarantee announcements induced a decrease in the shareholder returns of the firms
that made the announcements. Each of the  four models/hypotheses received partial support.  
Key Words: layoffs, downsizing, event study, employment guarantee
JEL: J6 M10, M12￿
INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1980s, many American companies have implemented layoffs in an attempt
to reduce the size of their labor forces ("downsizing"), while a minority of firms have made
employment guarantee announcements which usually promised the continuing employment of
existing employees for a fixed term.  Despite the practical and theoretical importance of this topic,
the financial effects of layoff and employment guarantee announcements on the firm are still
unclear. Studies empirically investigating the impact of layoff announcements on shareholder
returns show mixed results, and to our knowledge, no published research treats the financial
effects of employment guarantee announcements. 
An article in the January 24, 1994 issue of Forbes entitled "How Layoffs Pay Off"
reported: "[w]ith a few exceptions, the stock prices of [Fortune 500 companies that laid off large
numbers of workers between September 1993 and January 1994] have risen on the day of their
layoff announcements" (Fefer, 1994). In other words, this report suggests that the market views
downsizing as a positive sign about a firm and its expected future profitability.  On the other hand,
Worrell, Davidson and Sharma (1991) and Caves and Krepps (1993) both the opposite results --
the downsizing announcements have negative effects on firm profitability.  Interestingly, the study
done by Chatrath, Ramchander and Song (1995) found seemingly contradictory results: layoff
announcements throughout the 1980s had negative effects on shareholder returns, while such
announcements had positive effects on shareholder returns in 1991-92. Thus, previous empirical
findings on the impact of downsizing announcements on profitability has been inconclusive.￿
Utilizing a sample of 368 firms that announced layoffs and 13 firms that announced
employment guarantees in 1993 or 1994, the present study attempted to measure the effects of
both layoff and employment guarantee announcements on shareholder returns.  The present study
is intended to expand the existing knowledge on this issue in the following ways. First, while there
are conflicting views on the effects these announcement will have on shareholder returns, previous
attempts have focused more on measuring the effects of announcements than developing a
theoretical framework.  In the present study,  we developed various competing hypotheses
explaining the effects of these announcements on shareholder returns, and the empirical results
will be used to examine the validity of each hypothesis.  Second, the present study attempts to
perform a more comprehensive analysis concerning the relationship between a firm's employment
decision and its profitability by measuring the effects of both layoff and employment guarantee
announcements on shareholder returns.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this paper, event study methodology will be used to examine the impact of layoff
announcements and employment guarantee announcements on the stock price of (shareholder
return to) a firm.  The essential idea behind an event study is: If a specific event affects the future
profitability of a firm, that event will induce a change in the shareholder returns to that firm when
information about the event is revealed to the investing public.  By comparing the firm's
shareholder returns given the event to what the return is predicted to have been had the event not
occurred, we can determine the impact of the event on the market's estimate of the firm's future￿
profitability.
In order to predict how the shareholder returns to a firm will respond to a layoff (or
employment guarantee) announcement, we must predict what the announcement, and the layoff
(or employment guarantee) itself, portends about the future profitability of the firm.  Previous
theoretical discussions on the effects of layoff and employment guarantee announcements can be
classified into the following four competing hypotheses: labor-cost, efficiency, industrial-relation-
effect, and signalling-effect hypotheses. These competing hypotheses strongly suggest that layoffs
and employment guarantees may send both positive and negative signals about the future
profitability of the firm.  Therefore, whether shareholder returns rose or fell in response to a layoff
announcement or an employment guarantee announcement will depend on whether the positive or
negative signals dominated. In this sense, the net effects of both layoff announcements and
employment guarantee announcements on firm profitability are empirical, rather than, theoretical,
questions.  Table 1 summarizes the theoretical discussion and the predictions of the competing
models.
Labor-Cost Hypothesis
The most overt effect of a layoff on firm profitability will be in the area of labor costs.
Since a layoff is a reduction in the number of firm employees, layoffs will decrease a firm's labor
costs in the long-run (Fuchsberg, 1993; Neinstedt, 1989; Reich, 1993). This decrease in labor
costs would increase firm profitability, ceteris paribus.  While there are short-term costs
associated with lay-offs (e.g., severance pay), and hiring and training costs resulting from the need￿
to replace periodically laid-off workers (Atchison, 1991; Hansen, 1986; Holusha, 1987), the
dominant view is that long-term cost-saving effect of layoffs may be greater than the additional
costs associated with severance pay, hiring and training new employees. Consequently, we would
expect shareholder returns to in response to the effects of a layoff announcement on labor costs.
On the other hand, an employment guarantee announcement should be associated with
increased costs to the firm by retaining existing employees (Foulkes, 1980; Greenhalgh,
Lawrence, and Sutton, 1988). While layoffs enable the firm to reduce labor costs, employment
guarantees prevent the firm from reducing costs. Consequently, profits (and shareholder returns)
should decrease in response to an employment guarantee announcement.
According to this view, layoff announcements will increase shareholder returns, while
employment guarantee announcements will decrease shareholder returns.
Efficiency Hypothesis
One of the main reasons offered to explain many of the layoffs implemented throughout
the 1980s and 1990s has been the firm's desire to increase its efficiency (De Meuse,
Vanderheiden, and Bergmann, 1994; Byrne 1994). Among the ways in which layoffs would
increase firm efficiency are through the elimination of unneeded tiers of management (Carroll,
1994, Collins, 1991), enabling the remaining employees to be more responsive to customer needs
(Hendricks, 1992), enhancing the communication process (Hymowitz, 1990) and expediting the
decision-making process (Neinstedt 1989).
These efficiency gains for the organization should be associated with increased profitability.￿
Hence, shareholder returns should increase in response to the efficiency effects associated with a
layoff announcement.
On the other hand, the efficiency effects associated with a layoff announcement should be
negative. Shareholder returns of a firm that announces an employment guarantee should decrease,
as investors would realize that the firm would be prevented from reaping the efficiency gains
associated with a layoff.  
There is some evidence supporting this view.  Caves and Krepps (1993), analyzing the
effects of layoff announcements occurring from 1987 to 1991, found that while layoff
announcements in general decrease shareholder returns, shareholder returns did not fall in
response to the layoff of white collar employees only.  If we one can assume that efficiency effects
are stronger in the reduction of white-collar workers than that of production workers, this can be
seen as supporting the view that there are positive efficiency effects associated with the layoff
announcement.  
In sum, this view suggests that layoff announcements will increase shareholder returns,
while employment guarantee announcements will decrease shareholder returns.
Industrial-Relation-Effect Hypothesis
The industrial-relation-effect hypothesis expects that layoff announcements will decrease
shareholder returns due to negative effects of downsizing on workers and industrial relations. It is
contended that the workers who remain with a company after downsizing become less loyal to the
firm (Foulkes and Whitman, 1985) and less motivated following the layoff (Holusha, 1987).￿
     
1In addition, there have been numerous reports in recent years attesting to the competitive
advantage that Japanese companies have enjoyed by providing their employees, both in Japan and the
United States, with job security.  The practices of these Japanese firms include those used by
American firms practicing job security, e.g., training employees to perform a variety of tasks,
reassigning workers to other duties in slack periods, hiring temporary workers, and so on.
(Abegglen, 1958; Calonius, 1983; Chira, 1986; Morita, 1986).
Brockner, J., S. Grover, T. F. Reed, R. L. Dewitt and M. O'Malley (1987), Brockner, J., S.
Grover, T.F. Reed & R. L. Dewitt (1992), and Roberts (1992) specifically find negative
relationships between layoffs and the productivity of employees who survive the layoff. Also,
layoffs may deteriorate industrial relations climate or union-management relations of the firm,
which could affect organizational performance in a negative way. 
However, the industrial relation effects of an employment guarantee announcement would
be positive. Among the hypothesized advantages are: protected employees are more receptive to
changes in their jobs and more amenable to performing a wider range of tasks than are
unprotected workers (Foulkes, 1980); protected employees are more loyal (Foulkes and
Whitman, 1985) and more motivated than unprotected ones (Holusha, 1987); firms that provide
job security enjoy greater recruiting advantages than firms that do not (Foulkes and Whitman,
1985); job security increases profitability (Lawrence, 1984), productivity (Mooney, 1984)
strengthens organizational performance (Rosow and Zager, 1984), and enhances prospects for the
firm's survival (Lawrence, 1984).
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According to this view, layoff announcements will decrease shareholder returns, while
employment guarantee announcements will increase shareholder returns.
Signalling-Effect Hypothesis￿
     
2It should be noted that in their sample, only 194 firms remained from 411 firms originally
identified as having announced layoffs during the relevant years.
The signalling effects of a layoff announcement are an ambiguous question. Whether the
announcement will affect shareholder returns positively or negatively will depend on two things:
the firm's perceived financial condition at the time the layoff is announced and the perceived
reasons given to explain why the layoff is being implemented. Some firms, particularly those that
are operating profitability at the time they announce a layoff, might announce a layoff for reasons
that would send positive signals to shareholders. Firms might announce layoffs in order to
streamline operations (Hymowitz, 1990); implement new, money-saving technology; become
more globally competitive (Fuchsberg, 1993); etc. We would expect shareholder returns to rise in
response to layoffs implemented for any of those reasons. 
On the other hand, if a firm in a financial distress announces a layoff, that announcement
may be viewed as a signal that a firm's financial problems are real (Worrell, Davidson and Sharma,
1991). We would expect shareholder returns to fall if shareholders believed that the layoff
announcement indicated anything negative about the firm's financial condition.  Worrell, Davidson
and Sharma (1991) examined the effects of 194 layoff announcements between 1979 and 1987.
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While they found that downsizing announcements had overall negative effects on shareholder
returns, shareholder returns responded more negatively to layoff announcements associated with
financial distress than announcements associated with other things (i.e., mergers). This would
appear to confirm the signalling effects argument.
The signalling effects of employment guarantee announcements should be positive.
Presumably, a firm would not announce an employment guarantee unless it were certain that its￿
financial condition was stable, and would remain stable in the future as well.
This view suggest that layoff announcements will either decrease or increase shareholder
returns, while employment guarantee announcements will increase shareholder returns.
Based on the preceding discussion the effects of a layoff announcement on shareholder
returns is an empirical question. The layoff announcement (and the layoff itself) should improve
firm profitability through the decrease in labor costs and the enhancement of firm efficiency, while
decreasing firm profitability through industrial-relations effects. The signalling effects of a layoff
announcement are indeterminate, depending on the reasons for the layoff.
As was the case with layoff announcements, the effects of an employment guarantee
announcement on shareholder returns is an empirical question. The employment guarantee
announcement (and the employment guarantee itself) should improve firm profitability through the
industrial-relations effects while decreasing firm profitability through the increased labor costs and
decreased efficiencies associated with the employment guarantee.
METHODOLOGY
Event Study
The objective was to assess the effect of both layoff announcements and employment
guarantee announcements on the value of the firm using standard event study methodology. The
event study assesses the effect of an event on firm value by comparing the equity returns of the￿
     
3Equity (shareholder) returns, rather than stock prices, are used to determine the impact of an
event on a firm.  The return to any security in time t is equal to its price change in that period plus
any dividend disbursements:
Rit = Priceit - Priceit-1 + Dividendsit
                 Priceit-1
A change in security returns in response to an event has the same interpretation as a change in stock
prices in response to an event.  Data on firm returns are maintained by "CRSP" -- the Center for
Research on Security Prices connected with the University of Chicago School of Business.
firm given the event with the expected returns absent the event.
3 Any difference is attributed to
the effect of the event being investigated (in this case, the announcement of a layoff or an
employment guarantee).
  The effect of the layoff announcement on security returns is given by the equation:
(1) ARit = Rit  E(Rit|No layoff announcement) 
where ARit is the abnormal return to firm "i"in time "t" due to the layoff announcement, Rit is the
actual return to firm "i"in time "t" and E(Rit|no layoff announcement) is the expected return to
firm "i"in time "t" had there been no layoff announcement. Rit is readily available, but E(Rit|no
layoff announcement), the expected return to firm "i" in time "t" is unavailable and must be
estimated. In this study, E(Rit|no layoff announcement) is predicted by the market model, which
posits that the return to any security in time "t" is a function of the stock market as a whole and
the risk of investing in that security relative to the risk of investing in the market. The ex ante
return to security "i"in time period "t" equals:￿￿
     
4The parameters in equation (2) for each firm were estimated from 150 through 50 days before
the layoff announcements. In other words, treating the date the layoff announcement was reported
in the Wall Street Journal as day 0, the parameters are measured from day -150 through day -51.  We
believe that 100 days were long enough to gain an accurate market model without being so long as
to risk the possibility of model parameter instability. Data from clearly outside the event period were
used so as to minimize the possibility of the firms' parameters having been affected by the event in
question.  
(2) Rit = .i + ßi(Rmt) + 0it
where Rit is the return to security "i"in time "t," Rmt is the CRSP value-weighted index of all
securities in time "t" and .i and ßi are parameters. 
4
According to the market model, 0it is a fair game variable with mean = 0 and var (1
2).
Therefore, equation (1) (the abnormal return to firm "i"in time "t" due to the layoff
announcement) is tested by examining the equation:
(3) ARit = Rit - [.i + ßi(Rmt)]
  
To determine the average effect of the event in period "t" for the sample of the firms, the
researcher merely averages the ARs over all the firms in the sample. 
(4) 1/n ￿ARit 
When the effect of the layoff announcement is being assessed over more than one day, an
average AR is computed for each event day and the ARs are then summed over all the event
months to estimate the average total effect of the layoff. This total effect is known as the￿￿
cumulative abnormal return ("CAR"):
(5) CAR = ￿ARit
Whether the layoff announcement affected firm value is determined by testing whether the
CAR computed in equation (5) is statistically different from zero. In order to make this
determination, the CAR must be standardized to account for the possibility of statistical error in
the determination of the abnormal returns. Peterson (1989) discusses several ways to compute
1(CAR) and obtain the following test statistic:
(6)    CAR             
 1(CAR) 
where CAR is the cumulative normal return and 1(CAR) is the standard error of the cumulative
normal return. This is the test statistic used to determine whether the layoff announcement
effected firm value.
As stated earlier, another goal of this paper was to compare the effects of employment
guarantee announcements on equity returns. Thus the same methodology just discussed was
applied, with the words employment guarantee substituted for layoff in the estimating equations.
A final t-test was performed to check whether the effect of employment guarantee announcements
equity returns was different from the effect of layoff announcements.￿￿
Sample
The effect of layoff announcements was assessed on firms that had layoff announcements
reported in the Wall Street Journal in 1993 and 1994. A Lexis search in the "Nexis" library and
the "WSJ" file initially identified 545 stories involving layoff announcements in 1993 and 1994.
This sample was reduced to eliminate announcements that would have revealed no new
information to investors (i.e., stories publishing the implementation of a layoff that had been
announced previously), and the methodology required the elimination of firms whose stock was
not traded on one of the three stock exchanges for each of the dates necessary for the appropriate
statistical analysis. The resulting sample consisted of 368 firms that announced layoffs in 1993 or
1994. 
A similar search was run to identify a sample of firms that had announced some sort of
employment guarantee for their employees during the same period. The one difference, however,
was that the Lexis search was done using the "Nexis" library and the "ALLNWS file. The final
sample consisted of 13 firms that announced employment guarantees in 1993 or 1994.  It should
be noted that some of the employment guarantee announcements were the result of a collective
bargaining agreement including a no layoff clause that was reached between the firm and the
union representing its employees while others were the result of an employer unilaterally
announcing that it would not layoff any employees.
Event Periods￿￿
Abnormal Returns were calculated for each of twenty-one days, consisting of ten days
prior to the layoff announcements through ten days after the announcement. It is standard practice
in event study methodology to calculate Abnormal Returns for a number of days before and after
the event of interest. Abnormal Returns Re examined prior to the event date because there is
always a possibility that information was "leaked" (i.e., became available) to certain investors
prior to the event date (the date that it was announced officially). Returns are examined after the
event date to account for the fact that it might have taken several days for the full effects of the
event to be impounded into firms' equity returns. Clearly, it is assumed that the Abnormal Returns
will be greatest on the event date (or within one or two days) and will be closer to zero as one
examines returns further away from that date. When calculating Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(CAR), four different periods were chosen. Test I examined shareholder returns over the 3 day
period from one day prior to the layoff announcement until one day after. Test II examined
shareholder returns over the seven day period from three days prior to the layoff announcement
until three days after. Test III examined shareholder returns over the eleven day period from five
days prior to the layoff announcement until five days after. Test IV examined shareholder returns
over the twenty-one day period from ten days prior to the layoff announcement until ten days
after. 
RESULTS
The effect of layoff announcements on shareholder returns are presented in Tables 2 and 4
and the effect of employment guarantee announcements on shareholder returns are presented in￿￿
Tables 3 and 5. Table 6 presents the mean difference between the CAR for layoff announcements
and employment guarantee announcements over the event periods encompassed by Tests I, II, III
and IV.
Dealing first with layoff announcements, the 368 companies that announced layoffs in
1993 and 1994 experienced negative shareholder returns in response to the layoff announcement.
On the day the layoff was announced, shareholder returns decreased by .07% (although this
decrease was not statistically significant). On the day prior to the announcement, shareholder
returns decreased by .85% (p-value <.05) although on the day after the layoff was announced,
returns actually increased by .15% (p-value > .10). Looking at the results over the four tests
discussed in the methodology section, the CAR was greatest for Test II. Over the seven days
included in that test, CAR was -.99% (p-value <. 05). These results are consistent with Worrell,
Davidson and Sharma (1991) and Caves and Krepps (1993), both of whom report negative
shareholder returns in response to layoff announcements (albeit those papers examined layoff
announcements that occurred in earlier years). The results are slightly different from those
reported by Chatrath, Ramchander and Song (1995), who report negative returns associated with
layoffs that occurred in 1981-1983 and 1984-1990 but report positive CAR in response to layoffs
that took place in 1991-92. 
Employment guarantee announcements also appear to have induced negative shareholder
returns in the firms that announced such guarantees, although these results should be interpreted
with some caution. Returns were negative in eight of the ten days after the layoff was announced.
On the day after the employment guarantee was announced, shareholder returns decreased by
1.0% (p-value < .01) and over the seven day period included in Test II, CAR decreased by .16%￿￿
p-value <. 05). On the day the employment guarantee was announced, however, shareholder
returns actually increased by .90% p-value <. 05).
Finally, in an effort was made to determine whether employment guarantee
announcements induced a greater negative response in shareholder returns than did layoff
announcements, the CARs were compared between the layoff sample and the employment
guarantee sample. Over the four Tests used, however, the difference in CAR between the two
samples was not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
CONCLUSION
In the present study, the event study methodology was used to assess the effects of both
layoff announcements and employment guarantee announcements on shareholder returns. The
Wall Street Journal was used to identify a sample of 368 firms that announced layoffs and 13
firms that announced employment guarantees in 1993 or 1994.
Both layoff announcements and employment guarantee announcements induced a decrease
in the shareholder returns of the firms that made the announcements. In addition, while
shareholder returns fell by more in the employment guarantee sample than in the layoff sample,
the difference between the two was not statistically significant at conventional levels.
One interpretation of the above results could be that employment guarantee
announcements are influenced by different effects from layoff announcements.  In other words,
when firms announce layoffs, the savings to the firm in the area of labor costs and efficiency are
less important than the industrial-relations and signalling effects.  On the other hand, when firms
announce employment guarantees, the increases in labor costs and the loss of efficiency to the￿￿
firm are more influential to the shareholders than are the industrial-relations effects and signalling
effects. 
While each of the above four models received partial support from he empirical results,
none of them obtained full support.  This again stress the fact that the net effects of layoff
announcements and employment guarantee announcements on firm profitability are not
theoretical, but empirical questions.  These results suggest that to broaden our understanding of
these phenomenon, future research should focus on the specific mechanisms of the effects of these
announcements as well as their net effects.
   ￿￿
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Table 11
Four Theoretical Models:
Hypothesized Effects on Shareholder Returns
___________________________________________________________________         
                                                          
Theoretical Models                  Layoff               Employment Guarantee 
                                            Announcement                   Announcement
___________________________________________________________________
Labor-Cost Hypothesis              Positive                             Negative
Efficiency Hypothesis              Positive                             Negative
Industrial-Relation-Effect         Negative                             Positive
Hypothesis
Signalling-Effect               Either positive                   Positive    




      Day AR  CAR
-10  .0002  0.0002
-9  .0014  0.0016
-8 -.0011  0.0005
-7  .0009  0.0014
-6  .0023  0.0037
-5  .0037*  0.0074
-4 -.0014  0.006
-3 -.0028  0.0032
-2  .0018  0.005
 -1 -.0085** -0.0035
0 -.0007 -0.0042





6  .0007 -0.0058*
7  .0022 -0.0036
8  .0021 -0.0015
9  .002 -0.0013  
10  .0006 -0.0007
* p-value < .10; ** p-value < .05 (two-sided test)￿￿
TABLE 3
EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE ANNOUNCEMENTS
Day AR    CAR
-10  0.006**      0.006** 
-9  0.0021   0.0081**
-8  0.0046*  0.0126**
-7 -0.0077***  0.0049*
   -6 -0.0021    0.0028
   -5  0.0092***  0.012
    -4 -0.0396***         -0.0277**
    -3 -0.0018 -0.0295**
    -2  0.0009 -0.0286**
   -1  0.0023 -0.0264*
     0  0.009***  -0.0174*
     1 -0.0103*** -0.0276**
     2 -0.0029  -0.0305***
     3 -0.0128***    -0.0433***
     4 -0.0022  -0.0455***
     5 -0.0039 -0.0495***
     6  0.0030 -0.0464***
     7 -0.0064*** -0.0528***
     8  0.0037 -0.0492***
     9 -0.0006  -0.0498***
    10 -0.0012 -0.0510***




TEST I -.0077 -1.99**
TEST II -.0099 -2.07**
TEST III -.0102 -1.69*
TEST IV -.0007 -.082
* p-value < .10; ** p-value < .05; *** p-value < .01 (two-sided test)￿￿
TABLE 5
EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE ANNOUNCEMENTS
          TEST                       CAR                    T-STATISTIC
  TEST I  .0010    .296
TEST II -.0156  -2.97**
TEST III -.0523  -7.90***
TEST IV -.0510 -5.580***
* p-value < .10; ** p-value < .05; *** p-value < .01 (two-sided test)￿￿
     
5In all cases, the difference reported is obtained by subtracting the CAR for layoff




TEST  MEAN DIFFERENCE      T-STATISTIC
TEST I -.0067 -.644
TEST II .0059 .021
TEST III .0423 .0858
TEST IV .0503 .958
*p-value<.10; **p-value<.05; ***p-value<.01 (two-sided test)